**HILL 75.9**

**PREFACE**

The following is a description of the fight for Hill 75.9, Devil’s Hill (German - Teufelsberg; Dutch - Duivelsberg) from 19th to 24th September 1944 between A Company of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment 82nd Airborne and units of …

The battle for Teufelsberg was one element of operation Market in the Nijmegen-Groesbeek region of Holland in September of 1944 during Operation Market Garden. The strategic importance of the Teufels Berg is that it overlooks the Nijmegen-Wyler highway and the Quer-Damm causeway, both of which are immediately at its base and are primary routes for any German forces attempting to relieve Nijmegen. And fortuitously, it is the highest point alongside the Nijmegen-Wyler highway\* providing a view deep into Germany to its north.

The point ‘75.9’ on a map might mislead a reader into thinking that the Teufels Berg is a single prominence. Rather, it is a section of ridge within a larger undulating ridge complex known as Wyler Berg.

After an initial introduction translated and reprinted with permission from a Dutch E-Zine I have allowed the story to be told entirely by the soldiers who fought over the Teufels Berg and the official U.S. Army reports sprinkled with occasional comments by me or other authors.

Every soldier’s experience of the same engagement is unique. For men dug into an undulating forested hill with orders to stay put at all cost, combat and survival become almost entirely personal. Consequently, individual veterans’ stories will naturally differ. Even more so when told 20 years or more after the event and memories blurred. Differences are not necessarily contradictions. They merely create a more interesting puzzle for the historian to solve.

**INTRODUCTION**

**At any cost, the capture of Devil’s Hill**

**De Gelderlander 07/02/2014**

BERG EN DAL – While the region was being cleansed of Germans during operation Market Garden (September 1944) lieutenant John Foley was given the task of capturing Devil’s Hill (Duivelsberg). Another platoon had been unable to overcome the German defenders, so Foley took A Company against the hill. It was essential that the hill fall into American hands, at any cost.

Devil’s Hill is important due to its oversight unto the Reich’s Highway between Germany and Holland. Whoever occupies the hill controls the line of supply and reinforcement.

Not much resistance was expected. It was supposed to be just a reinforcement and then a collective stroll up the hill. The reality was considerably more disappointing. As soon as contact was established with the platoon on-site, at the bottom of Filloslofendal (Philosopher’s Dale) the German machineguns rained bullets over the men. During efforts to knock out the machineguns by flanking moves, ten allied soldiers were killed. In this untenable position, Foley decided to frontally attack the hill. In the midst of the frightening noise of the rattling rifles and war cries Foley and his men reached the top of the hill at the cost of a few more men. ‘Stay here and dig in’ the lieutenant ordered at the top.’

The Germans immediately tried to retake the hill. In vain. ‘A’ Company gratefully augmented their own weapons with the abandoned German equipment.

In the days following, Foley became surrounded. Via radio, the commander was able to call in the artillery support essential to keep the Germans at bay. All German attacks were repulsed.

The capture of Hill 75.9, as it was called in military jargon, ultimately cost 15 (*American – translator’s insert*) soldiers their lives.

*Article by Roeland Segeren*

**U.S. ARMY RECORDS & PERSONAL MEMOIRS**

U.S. army records and personal memoirs are printed in ordinary font. *My comments and interpretations and those of other authors are printed in italics.*  Sources are identified at the start of each paragraph by their initials in square brackets. I have taken the liberty to correct spelling errors and to unify short forms and grammar for ease of reading. I have also used all-caps for significant place names to follow the style of the HQ reports.

**15-16 September 1944**

**[JB]** “The war tent was opened and we received the word that the jump would be in Holland; this we had never dreamed of. The platoon was first briefed by Lt. Foley. Later we had the opportunity to use the war tent on squad level. Inside the war tent was a sand table; this sand table was a miniature mock area of the combat mission in and around Nijmegen. We were issued maps and aerial photographs of the said area. Lt. Foley pointed out the assembly area, marked by a large haystack in the field. An assigned man in the company was to drape an orange piece of cloth on the haystack; as mentioned later this was effective. The survivors of the Normandy campaign took this briefing at heart. We remembered how fouled up the drop pattern was in Normandy. We studied those maps and I remember not a pencil mark could be put on them. The reason being that if a soldier was captured during the drop the enemy could gain information by this. Sgt. Van Enwyck, the Plt. Sgt., was looking forward to this operation, his ancestors having come from this, country. I remember him saying, ‘We're heading for the land of wooden shoes and windmills’.”

**[JB]** “Early that morning we were assigned an aircraft by tail number, and were lined up in stick-jump formation. Lt. Foley's plan consisted of one rifle sqd. and part of his plt. Hqs. (*Hq Support*) Van Enwyck, the Plt. Sgt’s. plt. consisted of our sqd. and part of the weapons sqd. (an airborne plt. at that time consisted of only two rifle sqds. and a weapon sqd.). We moved to the aircraft drew and fitted parachutes and secured the A-5 containers (bundled with machine guns, ammo, mortars, rocket launchers, etc.). These we placed into the para-racks (these were racks under the wing of the C-47). An assigned man in the stick would release these by pulling a lever down as he made the turn to depart the aircraft, usually the machine gunner in a rifle squad. This would put him descending close to the bundles. Everyone satisfied with his parachute, we move to the tents. The rest of the day we checked individual weapons, ammo to see that every round in the clips was even, taped two magazines (reversed) together for our Sub-Thompson machine guns. This could save a split second and we knew that a split second could determine between life or death. All this taken care of, we hit the sack. We knew we had a hard day's work ahead for us.”

**17 September 1944 – Dropping into Holland**

**[JB]** “First Call: We are up and ready to go. We knew this would be the last meal for some, but we didn't know which ones. Company formation was held and at this the Plt. Ldr. gave the last briefing before take-off. Lt. Foley put it to us bluntly; it went something like this, quote: ‘I have just attended a briefing and this is the word. A reconnaissance plane flew over our drop zones early this morning and photographed the area. There is said to be some 64 anti-aircraft weapons on and around our drop zones. In the wooded area near Groesbeek tanks have been spotted. The Division has no alternate drop zones so we go ahead as planned. I figure the fight will not last over three minutes after we hit the ground, so let’s be a winner. Be ready to fight and good luck.’ From here we went to the planes and began getting into the parachutes and securing our equipment. Oh! Lt. Foley also told us the planes over the drop zone would not be flying over five hundred feet. So at the plane we decided we would not use the reserve parachutes. About this time Lt. Foley came over to make his SOP (standard operation procedure) inspection and says, ‘What gives on the reserves?’ We tell him we decided not to use them. Lt. Foley, quote: ‘Regulation is you will board the plane with a reserve on.’ He smiled and returns to his aircraft. We load our plane and immediately off comes over two-thirds of the reserves on that plane load. All the combat veterans take theirs off and half of the replacements. Individual weapons were taken out from under the parachute safety belt as they were normally jumped. We used quite a bit of air corps masking tape securing these weapons to our arms as where we could maintain them during the jump. I remember Walter Dikoon who was armed with a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) preparing for the jump. He adjusting the sling on his arm and having me tape it firmly to his arm. Dikoon assured me he could jump this weapon at post arms and he would be ready to contest the enemy as soon as his chute opened.”

**[JB]** “We had jumped into the darkness in Normandy, had one hell of a time assembling. The most of us were at the wrong place, mixed-up units and small groups. We liked this idea of a daylight operation and knew that if we landed together as a team we would be hard to handle. Only thing I could not understand was why this operation was taking place on Sunday. This has never been answered.”

**[JB]** “We were given a take-off time which was around 1000 hours; our drop time was 1328 hours. This would be approximately a three and a half hour ride. We synchronized our watches at Lt. Foley's last briefing and knew that if we couldn't pick out land marks during the flight that the air corps would have us over the drop zone at the said time. We took off as scheduled, began to rendezvous with other small groups of aircraft. This continued for quite some time and then we were on the way to Holland. This flight took us above the thick white formation of clouds, this I had never seen before.”

**[JB]** “Our training flights back at Fort Benning and Camp Mackall had always been low and we the jumpers had good visibility of the ground. As we approached the coast of Holland we knew the planes were descending and soon we saw the North Sea. As we passed some small islands we received anti-aircraft fire; we knew our jump time was drawing near.”

**[JB]** “At this time we saw our first fighter escort, a British Spitfire. He was flying very close to our formation. We passed a very close Island and received fire from it. At this time we were flying no higher than six hundred feet. Standing at the door you could see the gun at work. From somewhere came a British Typhoon. It passed very close to our plane and dived straight for the gun position. Halfway to the gun position smoke flew from the Typhoon; we thought it had been hit. The plane was loaded with rockets and I think the pilot fired all rockets because the gun position went up in smoke. The pilot very gracefully took the plane out of the dive and was on his merry way. “

**[JB]** “Shortly we passed over the low land and the antiaircraft Increased. We kept checking our watches and jump time was drawing near. Shells began bursting very close to our plane. It was bouncing and holes began to appear overhead; the flak was breaking through. I looked around and saw Pvt. Beaver fall. A piece of shrapnel had hit and actually bent his helmet. He was knocked unconscious and was unhooked and rolled over on his seat. Less than a minute to go another trooper went down. A piece of shrapnel had torn into Pvt. Jump's boot and gave him a nasty wound. He also was unhooked and put aside. “

**[SW]** “Just before 1330 hours 17 September 1944, the lead plane of the 1st Battalion, leading the 508th Parachute Infantry, came over its designated drop zone and began the assault phase of Operation Market. As the Battalion Commander checked his parachute canopy, he became aware of ground resistance, for a long burst of machine gun fire came disconcertingly close to his right ear. However, the platoon of German anti-aircraft was soon smothered by the weight of the almost six-hundred jumpers even before the next serial in the regimental air column began dropping four minutes later.”

**[JB]** “My position was number three on this jump; Van Enwyck had assigned me duty to keep a sharp look out from the port side window and give him a sharp slap on the leg when I saw the first trooper make an exit from the plane on our left wing. I took a glance at my watch and the time was 1328; at the same time I saw the first man make his exit from the plane on our left. I slapped Van Enwyck on the leg; as I did, the green light came on and we were on our way out the door. This was a relief because I was expecting at any moment for our plane to be hit so severely that it would be knocked down.”

**[JB]** “I went out the door, my chute opened and I looked around and saw that we had jumped in a very close pattern. This was what we were shooting for. We encountered some small arms fire during the descent. Only one man in the company was hit, and this being Sgt. Anthony Cianfrani (the company clerk).”

**[JB]** “On the way down I observed a small house, and I had to slip like everything to miss landing on it. I did land in the yard and as I did, I saw one of our replacements (I can't recall his name) come straight for the house. As his boots struck the slate shingles several of them tore loose; his chute collapsed and he came sliding off. He hit the ground very hard. This was very dangerous and he had jumped with full combat equipment (approximately seventy pounds). He was a Spanish boy and spoke broken English; his only comment was, ‘Damned if a man couldn't get hurt if he did this many times.’ “

**[JB]** “From this position I spotted the haystack and knew this was the company assembly area. By the time I secured my equipment and was enroute, an orange cloth appeared on the haystack as was planned at the briefing. The company less one plane load was assembled in a very short time. This plane load jumped late and landed 2,000 yards east of the drop zone, this putting them in Germany. They joined the company later at De Ploeg with approximately 30 German prisoners.”

**[TB]** “I served with distinction in the Hq 1st light machine gun Plt. from August 15th to September 21st 1944, when I was critically wounded and evacuated. On September 17th 1944, a sunny afternoon, we parachuted into occupied Holland. I landed in a field occupied by German infantry and anti-aircraft guns just a few miles south of Nijmegen. I landed without a scratch, the German anti-aircraft guns were destroyed or abandoned with many Germans killed or captured. We were ordered to establish a road block on a major highway approach to Nijmegen.”

**[HQ]** “The 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry, commanded by Lt. Colonel Shields Warren, Jr., landed on DZ "T" (765585) and assembled rapidly. The battalion had moved to and occupied its assigned initial objective in the vicinity of DE PLOEG (725594) by 1830 hour, five hours after landing. This operation involved a march through enemy territory to the objective three miles from the assembly area.”

**[SW]** “Assembly of the battalion was rapid, and by H plus 1 hour, the entire battalion was assembled and reorganized with the exception of two plane loads which had dropped about one-thousand yards beyond the drop zone in the vicinity of the town of Wyler. Each of these aircraft had been hit by ack-ack just before arriving over the drop zone by fire from German 88's north of Nijmegen. The two plane loads, 1st Plt., A Co., came in about an hour later with twenty-three German PWs.

**[HQ]** “The following episode deserves special mention: Two plane loads from A Company were erroneously dropped approximately two miles east of the drop zone in German territory. Lt. Combs, the senior officer present, fought his way back to his battalion, killing an estimated 20 Germans and bringing back 49 German prisoners. Lt. Combs had 22 men in the group which accomplished this. Lt. Combs carried out this action after having been wounded by flak prior to jumping.”

**[MC]** *JB, SW and HQ report variously from 23 to 49 prisoners and having missed the DZ by 1,000 yds. to two miles (3,520 yds.).*

**[JB]** “We set up a defense at the assembly area and awaited orders to move to our objective. Shortly we were enroute to the objective (the high ground near De Ploeg). British Spitfires had circled our drop zone during the assembly and this gave us confidence. On the march to De Ploeg we looked up and saw four planes flying in trail; they circled our march column, so out with our orange identification cloth and we (*waved*) at them like hell. Someone says, ‘Look those planes have Iron Crosses on them.’ The German pilots dipped their wings at us thinking that we were a column of German soldiers out to do combat with the enemy.”

**[SW]** A Company, in the meantime, had been busy: 1st Platoon, as a combat patrol, had proceeded on H plus thirty minutes to secure that portion of the battalion objective which included the main road between Nijmegen and Groesbeek, and also to inform the Battalion Commander of any resistance enroute to, or on, the battalion objective. All platoons of A Company had been briefed on this mission, for the Normandy operation had taught the battalion that the unforeseen can take place on a combat jump. The battalion had just been directed by the Regimental Commander to proceed on to its objective, about H plus seventy-five minutes, when this combat patrol reported it was just short of the battalion objective and had met no resistance.”

**[SW]** “The battalion moved out in advance guard formation with flank patrols out, and conducted a routine cross-country movement to its objective, enlivened only by the capture of four German labor troopers who surrendered without ado. In the meantime the combat patrol had radioed back that the objective was unoccupied by any German troops, and that it was organizing a road block on the main road from Nijmegen leading south to Groesbeek. The Battalion S2, who had accompanied the platoon, stated that Dutch civilians asserted that no German troops were in the area, except for a few labor troops.”

**[SW]** “The 1st Battalion continued on to its objective (which was the extension of the high ground to the west and north of the Wyler Meer, and astride the Nijmegen - Groesbeek highway), and proceeded to organize the position and dig in, facing generally north, with the 3rd Battalion on the right, and the 2nd Battalion on the left. C Company was in battalion reserve, and A and B Companies occupied the MLR. As the battalion was organizing the MLR, a combat patrol consisting of Lt. Weaver's platoon of C Company was told to move into Nijmegen, investigate resistance in and around the bridge, and radio back on the strength of the bridge defenses. Lt. Weaver was given an SCR 300 (*a radio*) from battalion headquarters for this purpose. Lt. Weaver was further instructed that if the bridge was undefended, or lightly defended, to secure it, and immediately radio battalion. (‘It is believed that this patrol was directed by Regimental Headquarters, and Lt. Weaver was selected because he had fought through the Normandy campaign very ably and gallantly’).”

**[JB]** “We arrived at our objective without any contact with the enemy and dug in a hasty defensive position and awaited a mission. At this time our Bn. was in Division reserve. Mid- afternoon the Bn. less Co. C received an order to attack and secure the bridge across the Waal River, this being the Nijmegen Bridge. We received the order and it was something like this. Co. A will lead the way, the 3rd Plt. leading followed by the 1st Plt., followed by the 2nd Plt.”

**[JB]** “We moved out in that order, had not traveled very far when the lead plt. (3rd) was brought under enemy machine gun fire. This plt. had one casualty, Corporal Roy B. Lewis. Under fire Cpl. Lewis jumped into a foxhole that another trooper had already occupied. This trooper had fixed bayonet and Cpl. Lewis struck his leg cutting the artery. Cpl. Lewis died before he could receive proper medical aid.”

**[JB]** “From this action we the 1st Plt. moved through the 3rd Plt. and took the lead, my sqd. taking up the point. As we (the point) passed the village De Ploeg a lady came out with cookies and sandwiches. I accepted one of these as several of the troopers did. After we had traveled some distance and with a couple of halts, darkness approached us.”

**[HQ]** “At 2030 hour, 17 September, Companies A and B moved into the town of NIJMEGEN, to seize the road bridge across the WAAL RIVER, while C Company remained in position holding the high ground at DE PLOEG. Upon entering the town Companies A and B met strong resistance from the enemy garrison supported by armored vehicles. The attack was made with no prior reconnaissance, based on information from Dutch civilians that NIJMEGEN was practically defenseless. After two hours of street fighting in the dark, the action had become localized to platoons, squads, and even smaller groups.”

**[SW]** “Just before dusk, about 2000 hours of D-day, the Regimental Commander ordered the 1st Battalion Commander to take his battalion, minus C Company, one section of 81mm Mortars, and one section of machine guns into Nijmegen with the mission of securing the highway bridge over the Waal River. This was the first time the battalion was told it was to secure this bridge. By the time the battalion minus [sic] was assembled from its rather wide defensive positions, it was well after dark. A Dutch underground worker who had contacted Regimental Headquarters had stated that the highway bridge over the Waal River was defended by a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men. This Dutch patriot also volunteered to guide the battalion into the town.”

**[JB]** “As we neared the town of Nijmegen a Dutch underground agent was dispatched to us (the point). He worked with Pvt. Walter Dikoon (the squad scout) that was preceding the sqd. 25 to 50 yds. The Dutchman was using a bicycle and would ride forward to the next block, report back to Dikoon that all was clear; in turn Dikoon would inform the point and we moved forward. This Dutchman was very helpful and instrumental in the movement of our Bn. through Nijmegen that 17 Sept. night.”

**[Jan Bos]** “*The man on the bike, who guided you into Nijmegen was Geert van Hees, 23 years old. Student. He was (sic ‘not’) killed but captured by the Germans, after he warned you that Germans were approaching, he managed to escape on September 18”.*

**[SW]** “The route into the bridge area was selected in consultation with the Dutch civilian. When the Battalion Commander suggested the most direct route to the bridge, on the concept that speed was most important, the Dutch civilian pointed out that that route was covered by an 88mm gun, and that the street was very narrow. He suggested a route nearly as short which followed a broad boulevard into town, and then swung east into the bridge area from the flank. He also pointed out that this route went by the Dutch underground headquarters in the city, who could give us the last minute information on the bridge defenses. Working on the theory that if the Dutch civilian was loyal, we could gain much since no member of the unit had been in this large city before and lose only a few minutes of time if he wasn't, the Battalion Commander decided to use the latter route. Another contributing factor was the knowledge that the combat patrol under Lt. Weaver was using the other route. If it was open, and the one the battalion used was blocked, the two were not so far apart that the movement could not be changed enroute.”

**[JB]** As we entered Nijmegen on the Groesbeek road one block from the Mock intersection the Dutchman reported to Dikoon that a German machine gun was set up facing in our direction. This is where the Dutchman was moved aside; we told him to take cover and we moved forward. About this time a Lt. from Bn. joined the point and located himself in the middle of the street. As we moved forward someone warned the Lt. not to move along the middle of the street, but he did not take heed. Our squad (the point) was broken down into two groups, each group moving along on opposite sides of the street staying very close to the houses and picket fence. A German MG-42 opened up; you could see the tracers ricocheting off the cobblestone street. The first burst got the Lt. in the leg. We ran and pulled him along the iron picket fence. My first thought was they got Dikoon. But now a BAR opens up up front and Dikoon comes running back and reports that he had knocked out the machine gun crew. At this time and place here comes Lt. Col. Shields Warren (the Bn. CO), Capt. Jonathan E. Adams CO A Co., and Lt. Foley up to the point to see what the situation is. Col, Warren says good work men, keep the ball rolling. Dikoon moves up to the intersection moves right and we are one block from the Keizer-Karel Square (circle). As Dikoon moves forward he is killed outright by machine gun fire from the square. Capt. Adams has the 2nd Plt. attack through the 1st Plt. and for the square.”

**[SW]** “In the meantime we hear motors warming up at the square. Lt. Foley calls for two rocket launchers, these two teams came up immediately and were placed along the curb. All troops were ordered off the curb along side the picket fence. At this time a half-track moved forward loaded with German SS troops and came abreast the rocket launcher teams; both open fire at the same time. This disabled the half-track and all the SS troops jumped off the vehicle and ran in all different directions. Our orders were not to fire if we came to close combat; we were to use trench knives and bayonets. The most of the 1st plt. had been moved inside the fence and between the houses. Here is where Co. A 508 did some hand-to-hand combat. These SS troops were jumping the fence and trying to get away. Pfc. Ray M. Johnson from Munsford, Ala., and myself were between two houses which were very close together. Pfc. Johnson was armed with an M-1 rifle with fixed bayonet and was ready for business. It happened that the CO of the SS unit (a Captain) jumped the fence and was trying to make his get-away by the way of our two buildings. We see him coming, I say to Johnson get him with your bayonet; as he comes between us Johnson gives him a long thrust and completely misses him. The M-1 was dislodged from Johnson's hands. I'm armed with a Tommy gun and trench knife; I have my trench knife out and I've got to get this German. At the rear of these two houses is an inter-locking tall wooden fence. This German officer is trying to get over this fence. I'm coming up to his rear trying to make a decision as to contest him with my short trench knife or let him have a short burst from the Tommy gun. I choose the latter, because that trench knife seemed mighty short at that time. I knew I couldn't let this German get on the other side of the fence, he could have destroyed us with grenades. When I fired a short burst (three rounds) Lt. Foley sounds off, "Who in the hell's firing the Tommy gun?" I sound off, "It's me", he knew who it was and that closed that chapter.”

**[SW]** “The movement into town, with A Company leading - point out front - was uneventful until the point reached the traffic circle in the city where it was to swing right toward the bridge. The time was a little after 2200 hours. A sharp "Halt", unmistakably in German, came through the dark, followed by a prolonged burst of fire from a Schmeizer machine pistol. A Company's point took cover, and returned the fire. The Battalion Commander, in the advance party with the A Company Commander, Captain Jonathan E. Adams, directed the Company Commander to attack, secure the traffic circle, and block all entrances to it from the west. A Company immediately attacked as ordered, bogging down in the fierce fire and a hail of grenades just beyond the traffic circle. The company took a number of casualties, and became somewhat confused in the darkness, so it was ordered to hold what it had gained, while B Company was ordered to take up the attack on the right of A Company.”

**[CG]** “Germans cut loose on the platoon with heavy automatic fire from close range. In the darkness control was momentarily lost and then: Sergeant Gushue (*2nd Pln.*), acting on his own initiative, reorganized his squad and led it against the enemy position. He threw grenades and charged a machine gun position bayoneting three Germans and forcing the remainder to withdraw.”

**[JB]** “In the meantime, a self-propelled gun fires two rounds in our direction and moves from the circle. The 2nd Plt. moves to the square and occupies the southeast side, the 3rd Plt. follows up and ties on with them. We, the 1st move up and tie in with them. This is leaving the north side open. At this time Capt. Adams (the Co. Commander) takes the 2nd Plt. and moves out for a look at the Nijmegen bridge. Higher intelligence has passed the word that demolition controls are housed in the Belvedere. The Belvedere is part of Charles the Great's old fort that still remains in Nijmegen. Its location positions it as a tower over-looking the bridge from the south side.”

**[JB]** “The Adams force attacked the German strong point around the Belvedere. In this action Sgt. Alvin Henderson (Texas) was killed. Sgt. Henderson ran through machine gun fire to throw phosphorous grenades into the building. Withdrawing back across the street Sgt. Henderson was mortally wounded. Sgt. Henderson was awarded, posthumously, the Distinguished Service Cross. Capt. Adams and this plt. (*2nd Pln.*) were encircled in the building in this vicinity for three days and nights before relief could reach them.”

**[CG]** “Upon encountering resistance near the approaches to the Nijmegen bridge Sergeant Gushue single-handed, assaulted one machine gun position and bayoneted four Germans. The action of Sergeant Gushue enabled his platoon to seize and hold a position near the bridge until contacted by British armored unit's three days later,,, On that particular night, the 17th of September 1944, the 22-year-old … Gushue … was not the only A Company trooper cutting up Jerries with steel instead of lead. There was S/Sgt., Alvin Henderson, Gushue’s buddy who was mortally wounded in the bloody battle that brought liberty to Nijmegen. In the posthumous award of the DSC to S/Sgt. Henderson citations orders record that he killed two Germans in hand-to-hand fighting and bayoneted four others … He led his patrol in the accomplishment of three separate missions during the attack by his battalion during which time he personally destroyed lour enemy machine gun positions and assisted in the capture of six prisoners. When the point of the battalion advance became pinned down by enemy machine gun fire in the city of Nijmegen, Staff Sergeant Henderson led a squad from the advance guard and pushed forward destroying this enemy position. He attacked a circular plaza to his front and cleared 13 of the enemy. Later at the bridge he personally destroyed two machine gun positions and caused the crew of the third to withdraw. During this attack he was killed by enemy fire."

**[JB]** “Back at the Keizer-Karel square the 3rd and 1st Plt. are holding on the south-east side. A lot of movement to our front across the square, I report this to Plt. Sgt. Van Enwyck. He tells me to take two men and feel out the situation and see what is coming off. I take Ray Johnson and McMillan move across the square facing the street that leads to the train station. It is here that we stop and listen to see if we could detect any sound or movement. We were standing by a large foxhole dug by Germans. While standing there listening, we hear the cocking action of a German MG from across the street and knew what was to follow. MacMillan dives for the hole with me following closely. As I land in the hole and look up, I see Ray Johnson falling toward the hole. The tracers from the German MG are providing enough light for me to know they are striking him. Johnson falls on me mortally wounded. Here within two hours two of my (basic training) comrades have been killed. "Mac" and myself are in a hell of a position in this hole and something has to be done. The Germans have spotted us and are throwing pop grenades trying to hit the hole and they are coming close. Mac says, "Blue do something."

**[JB]** “At this time I'm on top of the hole. I push Johnson's body aside, reach for a phosphorous grenade, pull the pin, and throw in the direction of the MG position. It went off and lit up the area as usual. I could hear the MG crew breaking down the gun and going out of action. I call back for our machine guns to open up and they did. They fired a few bursts over us in direction of the Germans' previous position. At this time I call back to cease fire, we're returning.“

**[JB]** “We returned to our line and shortly another MG opens up to the front of the 3rd Plt. There were several casualties, one being Mr. James R. Benton, Fayetteville. N.C. (*then 1944 Pfc. Benton*). Mr. Benton received approximately seventeen MG bullet wounds in the right arm, side and leg.”

**[JB]** “During the halt at the circle our operation orders are changed. Capt. Adams is now with the encircled 2nd Plt. near the Nijmegen bridge. Lt. Foley takes command of the company. We (A and B Company) now had the mission to return to Drop Zone T and re-capture it. The Germans had moved in from Germany and were in possession of this large field. The field (DZT) was to be the landing zone for a large number of our gliders which were to arrive at 1200 hrs.”

**[HQ]** “The night of D Day, 17 September, found the 1st Bn. deployed as follows: Bn. CP in the vicinity of 731591. Company A, followed by Company B, attacking to seize the NIJMEGEN highway bridge, had reached and was fighting in the parkway at 716625. A Platoon of Company C plus the Bn. S-2 section, by a different route and at an earlier hour had advanced to and fought in the same parkway. This unit returned to Company C and the Bn. CP respectively at 0800 hour, 18 September. Company C, less one platoon, was in battalion reserve in the vicinity of the Bn. CP.”

**[SW]** “… while B Company was ordered to take up the attack on the right of A Company. B Company promptly complied with the order and ran into severe resistance, and was stopped by the intensity of the fire. In the meantime the Dutch civilian had disappeared (he was later found to have been killed in the initial fire fight). “

**[MC]** *He was captured, not killed.*

**[SW]** “At this stage, the Germans counterattacked, partially over running A Company, which was not completely reorganized from its initial attack. The German attack was stopped, B Company’s reserve platoon committed to cover the sector occupied by A Company, and A Company was pulled back and reorganized. At this time a runner was sent back to Regiment (the SCR 300 radio would not carry over the five miles to the Regimental CP) to inform the Regimental Commander of the situation and request release of the remainder of the battalion to battalion control. The Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, on the basis of resistance received, had reached the conclusion that he was opposed by a force equal in strength to his own, and more strength was needed to accomplish the mission assigned. In the meantime, A Company's reorganization was completed, and another plan of attack evolved where B Company would attack to its front, while A Company moved around the right to try for the bridge again. B Company's attack would keep the German force pinned, and cover the flank and rear of A Company. The attack went off as planned, and A Company had advanced to within about four hundred yards of the bridge when another German force not in contact with B Company, counterattacked, isolated most of A Company's 1st Platoon under Lt. George Lamm, and the Company Commander, Captain Adams, who was up with his lead elements. The remainder of the company again became disorganized, and fell back on the B Company position.”

**18 September 1944**

**[HQ]** “After bitter street fighting during the night 17-18 September, Company B had pushed through the Company A position to vicinity 708621 by daylight. Shortly after dawn Company A was in the process of reorganizing to push the attack to the final objective when a strong German attack developed on the south regimental flank in the WYLER area. The Germans were already beginning to overrun the glider landing zone located there. At 0800 hour 1st Bn. was ordered to send Company C to the vicinity of GROOTE VEIERENBERG (747584) to hold the high ground at that point and to secure a line of departure for a contemplated counterattack to clear the landing zone. Company A and the 81mm mortar platoon returned to the DE PLOEG area, reorganized, and moved out to the southeast prepared to either attack to clear the landing zone or to move east and attack the NIJMEGEN bridge in conjunction with Company G which was making good progress towards the bridge from the southeast. Company B remained in possession of the park at 716625.”

**[HQ]** “By this time Captain Adams and a platoon of Company A, still in NIJMEGEN, had reached and destroyed what is believed to be the control room for the demolition of the bridge. Captain Adams and this platoon were cut off, surrounded, and remained in NIJMEGEN, eventually rejoining their battalion on 22 September. During the time they were cut off, this force was fighting constantly, engaging a superior German force.”

**[SW]** “By now it was dawn, and while the remainder of the 81mm mortar platoon had been released to battalion control, "C" company and the section of machine guns was still retained by regiment. Word also came back that the combat patrol under Lt. Weaver of C Company had been unable to reach the bridge, and estimated resistance south of the bridge to be about company size. By now the ‘NCO and seventeen men’ guarding the bridge were considered to be a remarkable group of men by the 1st Battalion Commander. While A Company was being reorganized, preparatory to continuing the attack, the Division Commander, General James Gavin, drove up in one of the division's reconnaissance jeeps, and wanted to know the particulars of the action. When he was told that we did not yet have the bridge, but that the attack would be continued shortly, he told 1st Battalion Commander to hold where he was, because the German forces were attacking in the southeast portion of the perimeter, and that the 1st Battalion might be needed there.”

**[HQ]** “On the glider landing zone Company D was engaged in bitter fighting with a much larger German force. By 1100 hour, 18 September, the enemy had surrounded Company D and was threatening to overrun the regimental supply dump. The regimental S-4 had organized the supply personnel into a fighting unit and was evacuating his supplies under enemy fire. The seriousness of the situation necessitated prompt and forceful action.”

**[HQ]** “The 1st Bn. was ordered to attack without delay to drive the enemy from the landing zone with the KAMP-LAGEWALD road the battalion objective. Company B moved from NIJMEGEN to DE PLOEG to rejoin the remainder of the battalion. From there Colonel Warren moved his unit to the line of departure at GROOTE VEIERENBERG, now secured by Company C.”

**[SW]** “Shortly before 1000 hours D plus 1, Regiment ordered the 1st Battalion to break off the action in the town, counter march to the vicinity of the drop zone of the previous day, (some seven miles distant) counterattack the two plus German companies there who were forcing D Company, 2nd Battalion back, so that the landing zone would be clear for the glider landing scheduled at 1300 hours for the three glider borne battalions of the division artillery. The Battalion S3, Captain James Dietrich, was dispatched to have B Company break off the action. A company, not in contact, was ordered to immediately move to an assembly area, and the Battalion Commander started for the Regimental CP on the double to get the details of the plan. Upon arrival, he found out that C Company was released to his control, with the remainder of the machine gun platoon. C Company, commanded by Captain Schofield, had also been dispatched to secure a line of departure for the battalion by the Regimental Commander.”

**[JB]** “Orders were issued and we departed the town of Nijmegen at daybreak. A short distance out of Nijmegen, I heard a train and looked to the right some 300 yds. and saw it with full head of steam heading south. I am up at the head of the column and question Lt. Foley as to what gives with the choo-choo. Lt. Foley has the ‘big picture’ and assures me the train would be taken care of or checked out at a strong point- south or west, either way the train went. Some few miles south the train took the track left toward Germany. It caught a certain unit (strong point) by surprise and choo-chooed on into Germany. They were expecting hell to break loose to their front and before they knew what had happened, a train had escaped through their lines. A few hours later the second train came from Nijmegen, it did not get through.”

**[SW]** “The attack, which had debouched from the woods on the flank of the two plus German companies had captured 149 prisoners and killed approximately 50, with a loss of ten casualties. The sixteen dual 20mm's were either destroyed or captured in this action also. The formation for the attack was B and C Companies in the assault and A Company in reserve. Captain Adams and Lt. Lamm were still missing with most of A company's 1st Platoon.”

**[JB]** “We (A and B Companies) arrive at an assembly area and C Company joins us for the attack across the DZ area, B and C Company on line and A in support. We (A Company) followed and could observe those two rifle companies on line attacking. They moved across the fields firing at every possible target. Company A moved to the left and took care of a few snipers along a fence line. We passed a barn and a Dutch farmer was very sad. A stray bullet had hit his large work-horse and broke its leg. The horse had to be destroyed. Also dead Kraut bodies could be seen here and there. This mission completed, B and C Companies established strong points along the Wyler-GroesbEek road with A Company back in reserve. A Company now consisted of only two rifle plts. We moved to high ground to the immediate rear of B and C Companies. We remain in this position during the night of 18 Sept. with no contact with the enemy.”

**[TG]** “Led by four brave Company C men, the 1st Battalion supported by Hq1 81mm mortars and machine guns, launched the assault at 1245. As the first of the arriving gliders were released over the drop zone, the battalion was destroying the antiaircraft guns, and killing or capturing the remaining Germans. Fifty Germans were killed and 149 captured. Fourteen of the 15 anti-aircraft guns were destroyed. The 508th PIR lost ten men.”

**[HQ]** “At 1230 hour the battalion attacked, Companies B & C abreast, Company C on the right. The CP group followed in the center at 300 yards, with Company A following Company B at 400 yards, in battalion reserve. Emerging from the woods 600 yards northwest of VOXHIL, the companies encountered heavy small arms fire but quickly pushed beyond the first high ground. A Bn. CP was established in the vicinity of 762578. Continuing the attack at a run, Companies B and C cleared enemy opposition in the vicinity of VOXHIL-VOSSENDAAL, 7757. Company A, less one squad which cleared the high ground on the left flank (vic. of 764583), pushed rapidly up WALDGRAAF ROAD to the vicinity of VOSSENDAAL-WYLER (781583). The 1st Bn. seized its objective at 1400 hour, as the gliders were coming in to land.”

**[SW]** “The glider landing was delayed for one hour, and the attack of the battalion, launched at 1245 hours was silencing the last of the sixteen dual 20mm ack-ack guns as the first of the gliders was released over the landing zone.”

**[HQ]** “In this action the battalion killed approximately 50 Germans and captured 149. The battalion also neutralized 16 20mm guns which had been firing on the landing zone. Up to this point losses were light, due to the speed of the attack. (Four WIA in the CP group, two KIA and five WIA in the rifle companies).”

**[HQ]** “Two squads on the left flank in the vicinity of 763583 reported that an indefinite number of Germans were moving from the vicinity of ALTHORST (767587).”  
  
**[HQ]** “The Bn. CO had Company A organize a defensive position in the vicinity of the high ground 200 yards northeast of the WALDGRAAF ROAD near 763583. Company B occupied the high ground in the vicinity of VOXHIL, 767583-765567. All companies established an outpost system 200 to 600 yards in front of this MLR before dark. Bn. CP was established in vicinity of 757575. Company C made contact on the right flank with the 505th Parachute Infantry in vicinity of KAMP (763563).”

**[SW]** “The battalion was ordered to dig in on the LZ, tie in with 3rd Battalion on the left, and D Company on the right. During the night it was ordered to seize and organize the TEufelS Berg, overlooking the Wyler Meer. The 3rd Battalion had been given this mission initially, but it had been hard pressed to hold its own. Lt. Col. Lou Mendez had lost ten Lieutenants in the day and a half's fighting, and a sizeable number of men. This high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal had to be held, since it dominated the entire area. As a result, only one platoon could be spared to seize the Teufels Berg, and it was too small for the job.”

**[HQ]** “During the night and early the next morning the line was extended to vicinity of TEUFELS BERG (764597) - ALTHORST (767587) - high ground (763583) - high ground (765576), with a platoon roadblock at WYLER and a point at 778580. Company E took over the VOXHIL area on the right flank.”  
  
[HQ] “Principal features of this series of quickly changing events were:

(1) The excellent control of all echelons of the battalion from the time of the drop through the period of this narrative.

(a) The rapid movement to and occupation of the first objective.

(b) The daylight withdrawal from the town in the face of German resistance.

(c) The rapid move to a directionally opposite objective.

(d) The attack from the correct area after a 2000 yard deployed march, much of it through heavy woods.

(e) The dashing attack, almost on a run, for 1000 to1200 yards in the face of 20mm, 40mm, and small arms fire.

(f) The prompt reorganization and movement without casualty to a chosen defense line, followed by prompt outposting and digging in.

(2) The excellent timing in employment of the battalion reserve for exploitation of a reeling enemy on the landing zone.

(3) The rapid decisions and orders of the Bn.CO, who after an all night street fight, throughout the next day, vigorously led the battalion on a rapid approach march  
followed by a fast attack and reorganization.

(4) The movie-thriller sight of landing gliders on the LZ as the deployed paratroops chased the last of the Germans from their 16 20mm guns.”

**[TB]** “At dawn, I discovered we were alone. A Company had gone into the city without telling us. After a guarded tour of the city looking for A Company or other friendly troops, we made our way back to the drop zone. There we learned our Battalion had engaged in a furious fight to wrest the drop zone from German infantry and anti-tank guns. These Germans were determined to destroy the arriving 82nd Airborne Division, Glider Borne Artillery and the Divisions heavy engineering equipment. The Germans were killed or captured and 19 of the 20 anti-aircraft guns were destroyed. All of the Gliders landed safely.”

**19 September 1944 – Day 1 on the Hill**

**[JB]** “The following morning we made arrangements with a Dutch farmer to use some of a beef that had been killed in clearing the DZ. He provided us with a large iron wash pot for the cooking. On our own initiative we rounded up potatoes, carrots, and onions for the big stew. This is when we learned that Sgt. Van Enwyck wasn't such a good cook. Everyone ate at least a canteen cup; after all, we had not eaten a full meal since the morning of the 17th.”

**[BE]** *“As a part of 508 PIR’s general advance from Berg en Dal to the Wyler/Nijmegen road, a platoon from Company G was tasked to secure the wooded high ground of the Duivelsberg. …As the platoon approached the hill from the west, they came under heavy fire and fell back to their start line. “*

**[BE]** *“… the route initially selected by the Americans was up some steep rocky terrain. Reinforced by a squad (approximately ten men) from the platoon manning a nearby roadblock, the Company G platoon repeated the attack but without success.”*

**[BC]** "When they sent me out on the patrol to the hill, there was a farmhouse, and I stopped in it. There was an old man and a young boy; he was maybe fifteen, who spoke broken English. I showed him the map and said, 'Where is this?' I wanted to make sure I was leading this patrol in the right direction. He took us right to the back of the hill. There was a knoll in back there that was higher than the hill itself. We were looking right down on them. That's when I decided that our fifteen to twenty guys in this patrol could not take this company alone. A lot of them were sitting on the edge of their holes, combing their hair. It was a sunny day. So I had the men each pick out one of them and said 'We're going to shoot them and get the hell out of here.' So we opened fire and we got the hell out of there."

**[HQ]** “The attached platoon of Company G had been beaten off the hill three times during the morning by an estimated company of German paratroopers”

**[JB]** “In the afternoon we got the word we had another mission and rumors were this would be a tough one. The order informed us that we were to attack a piece of high ground called Devil’s Hill. This hill (300 ft. high) was just inside the German border. This hill was very important to the Germans; from here they could keep a large area of ground under surveillance. We knew they would not give it up without a struggle. This hill had been a mission for a plt. of G Company. They had made an effort, but found that it was not a plt. size mission. Now for A Company's attack we had the plt. from G Company to assist us. Lt. Foley included in the order that the hill would be taken at ALL COST. ‘All cost’ meant the life of all concerned.”

**[SW]** “The only forces left to the 1st Battalion Commander to secure the Teufels Berg - some 3500 yards from his right flank - was a small A Company. Lt. John P. Foley, Captain Adam's Executive Officer, was given the mission, and reinforced with a four gun LMG section. He accomplished what the platoon of the 3rd Battalion had been unable to do by moving in close to the German defenders by stealth and then launching a sudden screaming attack at the run in the early hours of the ~~morning~~ (sic: *evening*). The German forces were quickly overrun, and Teufels Berg secured.”

**[HQ]** “At 1530 hours on the 19th, CO Company A (Lt. Foley, commanding in the  absence of Captain Adams, who was still fighting in NIJMEGEN) was alerted for an attack on HILL 75.9. Company A at this time consisted of 2 officers and 42 men from the original company plus an attached platoon of Company G numbering 34 men and 1 officer. At 1600 hours the Bn. CO ordered Company A to seize and hold HILL 75.9 and established a roadblock at its base, where the BAD WYLER causeway met the main highway (765598).”

**[JF]** “If my memory served me correctly the period in question started something like this --- Shields Warren sent for me shortly after we had withdrawn from town and presented me with the following GO (*general order*). He wanted me to take the remainder of A Co. with additional fire support from Hq. A Co. and go the relief of a platoon from the 3rd Bn. which had been given the mission of securing the right flank of the 3rd Bn. This unit had attempted to secure Devil’s Hill earlier in the morning but could not overcome the German resistance, and as the only recourse Col. Mendez had requested Regt. to assist in this problem. As a direct result of this request we, the lucky ones of A Co. had been designated to secure the relief of the platoon from the 3rd Bn. and secure at any cost Devil’s Hill. I was assured that this would not be as difficult as it appeared and Col. Warren wanted to be able to pass on to Regt. that we would have it secured by nightfall. The movement from the Bn. area to our jumping off place went without much notice as I remember it.”

**[JBr]** “I remember those days on Devil’s Hill as clearly as though it happened last week. It was a bright sunny almost cheerful day that a platoon of A Company reinforced with a platoon of ~~engineers~~ (sic, *G Company*) set out for the hill.”

**[JB]** “We moved out through the wooded area and crossed the Wyler-Beck roAd which was the Holland-Germany border.”

**[GG]** “Foley and his men entered the forest (*moving* *north*) and exactly at 1700 hrs they crossed the Berg en Dal – Wyler road.”

[JB] “An enemy force was sighted in the direction of Wyler. Lt. Foley dropped off part of the 1st Plt. to protect his attacking force. I was with this group. We rushed up the road to a position in the woods where we had a good field of fire and dug in positions. This enemy force held up and was reluctant to attack. During this activity an old German farmer continued his work around his barn with horse and cart. We stayed at this position while the Foley force made the attack on Devil's Hill. From all reports this was the outstanding attack of the "MARKET" operation.”

**[JBr]** “Lt. Foley found the trail leading to the hill with little difficulty. They apparently had no perimeter guard because our first contact was with one of their two machine guns. Lt. Foley called for a bazooka up front. He sent V.G. Pierce with his squad to the left of the hill with the bazookaman, they (12), were cut down with one sweep of the gun. The rest of us were scared and confused. S.Sgt. Jahnigen told us to yell like Indians and charge up the hill. We did, I ran between 1st. Sgt. Taylor and a new replacement, half way up the hill a burst was fired into us. Taylor and the new man went down. I thought I’d better do the same. I turned to the man on my left to see how he was; he couldn’t answer, he was bleeding from the mouth. Sgt. Taylor said, ‘Brick take my sub-Thompson and move up if you can, I’m hit in the shoulder’.”

**[JF]** “It wasn’t until we had made contact with the 3rd Bn. unit that we ran into any resistance of count. I believe that when we attempted to approach Devil’s Hill from the left flank we lost a few men on a poor move by me. It wasn’t until they had picked off two bazooka teams that I decided we had to go at them from the front. Deploying Hq. Support Co. personnel to our right rear and giving us close supporting fire we rushed the objective and secured it.”

**[LF]** “On September 19, Company A, reinforced with my section of light machineguns was ordered to seize Devil’s Hill; and establish a roadblock where the Nijmegen-Wyler road joined a causeway. As we approached the hill, Allied planes strafed us – they were shooting at the Germans on the hill – and apparently thought we were Germans. When the A Company men neared the top of the hill, they were pinned down by machinegun and rifle fire. The acting company commander called for our light machineguns. Our machinegun squads (Larry Fitzpatrick, Albert Chrisman, R.J. Crawford, Ralph Booth and [Carlton] “Johnny” Johnson) attacked through the Company A men and drove the Germans off the hill”.

**[UC]** “For his heroic action Fitzpatrick was awarded the Silver Star medal, and Chrisman and Johnson received bronze star medals.”

**[AR]** The firefight took us up the hill, and we were driven down the other side and cornered in a small ravine. With no place to run for cover and what seemed ten to one in firepower, Sgt. Piper asked if we should make a break for it or surrender. Russell Ludemann spoke fluent German and spoke to the Jerries for about two minutes. We were getting complacent when the Germans opened fire. Piper had a Thompson and immediately returned their fire. Someone said, 'Lets try to get out, we're done for anyway! I was at the back and closest to the best exit in the ravine. I ran out towards the top of the hill. I used to run pretty good, and on that day I would have beaten any of today's runners, steroids or no."

**[HQ]** “With the enemy on the eastern, western and northern slopes of HILL 75.9 Lt. Foley led his company through the woods, approaching the crest from the south and arrived at the LD undetected. 200 yards south of the crest. Company A deployed and charged the crest at a run. The Germans on the summit were literally yelled out of their holes, but recovered on the slopes and fought bitterly from positions on the hillside. They counterattacked repeatedly, supported by eight LMG's, but the men of Company A, fighting from hole to hole, gradually drove them down the very steep hill.”

**[UC]** *“When Lieutenant Call failed to hear any firing as they crossed the open ground before moving up the southern slope he knew their force had gained complete surprise over the German defenders.”*

**[FC]** “JOHN P. FOLEY, O-1287332, 1st Lieutenant, Infantry, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy, from 19 September to 24 September 1944, at Wyler-Meer, Germany.  During an attack, Lt. FOLEY moved with his attacking groups, coordinating their movement and directing their fire with such complete disregard to enemy fire that he imbued his men with much courage and daring.  He controlled the action of his three platoons with assurance, leading the attack and driving the enemy from the hill.”

**[JB]** “Germans were entrenched in fox holes all around the hill. The Foley force moved through the wooded area to the base of the hill, went into a skirmish line undetected, made the assault and ran the German parachutists from their foxholes.”

**[RW]** “The 3rd Platoon had no Platoon Leader on the attack of Devil’s Hill. The Platoon Leader Lt. Combs was hit in the legs by flak before the jump and dropped near Wyler, Germany.  2nd Lt. Alexander was KIA in Nijmegen the night of 17 Sept. As I recall S/Sgt. Jahnigen acted as Platoon Leader for the 3rd Platoon.”

**[RW]** “The attack order was passed down the line just before we got to the ridge. We attacked on the run over the ridge and down the north east side of the hill. The Germans on that side of the hill had their backs to us. The ones we did not kill ran down the hill into the woods. After the attack the 3rd Platoon took the position that we ran the Germans out of. I don’t recall any KIA’s or wounded in the 3rd Platoon. “

**[JBr]** “I reached the top of the hill with the others and the Krauts moved back from their guns and took off down the front slope. The Lt. from the ~~engineers~~ (G Company) said, ‘Let’s go after them.’ Lt. Foley said, ‘No, dig in.’ Lt. Smith charged forward with a big man from A Co., two shots rang out – Smith was stopped at the crest of the hill with a bullet in the fore-head, the other man had his biceps blown off. One of our men got excited and shot him by accident.”

**[JBr]** “We dug in and called Headquarters for ammunition and food. They requested a patrol be sent to the bottom of the hill. We picked up eight prisoners in the old inn at the bottom of the hill and came back and buried V.G. Pierce and his eleven men in a mass grave.”

**[MC]** *In two sentences JBr relates events that JB tells us occurred on the 19th (digging in) and the 22nd (resupply and burial of Pierce and his section).*

**[HQ]** “At 1800 hours on the 19th Company A's five light machine guns were emplaced on the crest, from where they fired on the Germans as they fled north across the open ground and southeast down the highway to WYLER. A Company lost ten men killed (all shot in the head) and seven wounded. Enemy dead littered the hillsides. At the foot of the hill the enemy left three motorcycles, two staff cars, a truck in running order and another truck which was damaged, two intact 20mm cannons with 300 rounds of ammunition, thirty odd rifles, and most of their miscellaneous individual equipment.”

**[MC]** *There is a multitude of ways to interpret the contradiction between HQ’s and JBr’s report of casualties. Certainly JBr would know exactly how many men he buried. Perhaps HQ’s account is incorrect both in terms of number and with regard to ‘head shots’ since Pierce and his men were killed by a MG burst. Perhaps HQ’s number refers only to the assault up the hill after the loss of Pierce and his men. Perhaps, and I think most likely, JBr’s burial account refers to the burial of all killed that day – and perhaps all of those came from Pierce’s platoon.*

**[FC]** “He (*Foley*) reorganized his company and staved off six vicious attacks by a determined enemy while the company position was raked with artillery and automatic fire.”

**[JB]** “The Foley force occupied the enemy positions and awaited the counter-attack. The counter-attack came and the Foley force held; this hill was the first attack into Germany on this operation. We, the holding force along the highway stayed in this position throughout the night, and were hit by the enemy in the early morning.”

**[HQ]** “At twilight the company reorganized and took up positions in the foxholes vacated by the enemy. Owing to the long battalion front (approximately 2000 yards) Company A was almost isolated from the remainder of the battalion, and it was extremely easy for the enemy to infiltrate in force through the wooded hills around the company. During the night, however, a carrying party of twelve men under Lt. Kelly (Bn.S-4) reached the hill with ammunition.”

**[HQ]** “At the same time that Company A was completing the capture of HILL 75.9, Company B, less one platoon, was attacking WYLER. After driving out the German garrison, estimated at one company, Company B quickly reorganized and established a defensive position and a roadblock at the main junction in the town. The roadblock was reinforced with two 57mm AT guns. At daylight the following morning four prisoners were captured in the houses of the village.”

**[SW]** “In the mean time, a two platoon strong point had been established in Wyler under Captain Woodrow Millsaps, the B Company commander, and the rest of the battalion front outposted to tie in to Millsaps strong point. The Germans began probing this outpost line early on D plus 2, and by night rail elements of two battalions had driven in the outposts, and Captain Millsaps strong point. The attack came at 0800 hours the morning of D plus 3, with its main effort aimed up the highway from Wyler. This highway was also the international boundary between Germany and Holland, and ran through Berg en Dal to Nijmegen. By noon the attack was stopped, but it had achieved a penetration of about 400 yards between A Company on the left, and B Company in the center. A Company was also under attack from the low ground north of the Wyler Meer.”

**[SW]** “C Company on the right was not under attack, so not having any other reserve, the Battalion Commander used elements of the headquarters to screen C Company's position, pulled the company out of the line, and counterattacked with it. The counterattack was successful, capturing about 35 prisoners, killing a similar number, and erasing the penetration. C Company was then placed back in the line.”

**[MC]** … and back on Devil’s Hill …

**[RW]** “The system I used for security was every other man awake two hrs at a time. No rest for me that first night. I was 100 yds or so from the C.P. To see Lt. Foley I went to the C.P.”

**[JS]** “I remember that the fighting was quite fierce at times, but the part which made the greater impression on me was the action after we were dug in. The soil was quite sandy, so the digging went quite well, but the sand was to haunt us later as it was constantly getting into the working parts of our weapons. During that first night on the hill, we were on edge with every rustle in the underbrush. We knew we had to conserve our ammunition, but intermittent fire went on all night as no one was about to take the risk of the enemy using the cover of darkness to regain possession of the high ground.”

**[GH]** “Held landing zone east of Groesbeek until 1800. Cleared enemy from and occupied high ground along Nijmegen-Cleve highway between Ubbergen and Wyler. Established road blocks at Wyler, Beek and Im Thal. Relieved by 504 Parachute Infantry in Jonker Bosch and occupied sector between Kamp and Voxhill. Reinforced Beck road block with platoon of Company D, 307 A/B Engineer Battalion; repelled counterattacks against Teufels Berg throughout entire day.”

**20 September 1944 – Day 2 on the Hill**

**[JBr]** “The next morning Sgt. White volunteered to try and contact Battalion Headquarters. He was out of sight five minutes when we heard his Sub-Thompson. Taylor and I ran toward the shooting and ran into White. He said, ‘I just killed seven Germans’. Sure enough in the nearest clearing was a patrol apparently taking a break when White surprised them. We realized we were cut off. Hq. affirmed this by radio, but said Lt. Col. Mendez could try and get to us after sunset.”

**[JF]** “The remaining account of this action is very hazy in my mind but do remember certain specific acts and incidents that followed. The evacuation of our wounded (under the direction of Lt. Peter E. Kelley). The request for surrender received but declined. The shortage of ammunition (relieved by the arrival of Lt. Kelley and his stalwart group from Regt.). The constant requesting of arty. support. Relayed through 3rd Bn. as we did not have radio communication with Bn. The position of those lonely outposts at the bottom of the hill (Sgt. Clements). The make shift communications system between Fox Holes. The trip to the bottom of the hill to the burnt out tavern for food. The only thing I remember we ever got was a supply of black bread and some Cherry Jam. Van Enwicks butcher shop set up further back of our position.”

**[HQ]** “During the night 19-20 the enemy activity in Company A's sector increased. At dawn a company of enemy, with artillery and mortar support, attacked the hill, making fanatical assaults up the hillside. In the middle of the firefight German fire ceased and a well-dressed German officer stepped into the open calling on A Company to surrender. Lt. Foley replied, ‘If you want me, come and get me!’, and ordered his men to resume fire. The fight continued for an hour before the attack was repulsed. Company A suffered one casualty, killed by an artillery tree burst.”

**[JS]** “With morning came noises of motorized equipment at the base of the hill and voices shouting as in preparation for an assault. Then came the mortar fire on our positions — we were sure this was the cover for the charge to follow. One of the shells hit close by and sprayed our foxhole with sand. On my next attempt to fire my rifle, I found it to be jammed. This appeared to be the end for me and perhaps my buddy (Guashino, I think) — I was suddenly useless to help defend our position. I was sure this was it — my one last and only shot would be my hand grenade which I jerked from my harness and stood ready for the exact moment. If I went, at least one Kraut was going with me! The pin was pulled and the tape removed from the handle; I crouched in my hole awaiting that right moment — until I could ‘see the whites of their eyes.’ Well, they never got that far, and there I was, stuck holding a grenade with only the pressure of my hand to keep it from exploding. After things quieted down, I was able to salvage the tape to wrap the handle and used the safety pin from my ammunition bandolier to temporarily replace the pin which was lost. I can't remember whatever became of that grenade, but it sure wasn't safe to have around in that condition.”

**[AC]** “At dawn, a company of Germans supported by artillery attacked ‘Devil’s Hill’ but was repulsed. Two hours later, they made a second attempt to take the hill. During the second attack, the Germans suddenly stopped firing and a German soldier appeared holding a white flag. As he was ascending the hill, I saw two German riflemen about 25 yards from him – waiting for any of us to show ourselves. With a warning, shout to our men, I pulled the pins on two of my hand grenades and rolled them down the hill toward the two Germans. We later found both Germans dead.”

**[MC]** *This account differs significantly from Lt. Foley’s. It is possible that these are separate events at different times or even at the same time at different positions along the line.*

**[FC]** “The second day, enemy infiltration had encircled his position and cut off all communication and supply routes to battalion.  A redistribution of ammunition revealed only five rounds per rifle and none for automatic weapons.  When called upon by the enemy to surrender his position, Lt. FOLEY defiantly refused, and continued to hold the hill.”

**[JS]** “After the early skirmishes, Devil's Hill was quiet at times for some long stretches; we still had to be on guard for fear of a sudden outburst from any direction. Sgt. Mullen, recognizing that the troops had not eaten a decent meal in days, took the opportunity to stake out in the little cottage which was at the peak of the hill (overlooking the flatlands below) and prepared a huge pot of soup for us. We spelled each other at the foxholes to take our turn going back. The soup was very greasy and loaded with red cabbage; it sure hit the spot!! We overlooked the small pieces of hair which had to be picked from our teeth as we ate. Sometime later, I found, out that Sgt. Mullen got his soup meat from a cow that was killed in the crossfire in the open field below the hill. He certainly was no meat-cutter in his attempt to select the proper cut of meat and dress it cleanly for the menu he planned. The red cabbage came from the cottage garden.”

**[JB]** “The peculiar layout of the hill is about 200 yds. long and 50 to 75 yds. wide. The north, west and south sides angling to a 30°, the west end with a gentle slope leading to a guest house approximately 200 yds.”

**[MC]** *JS refers to a “cottage” as being at the “peak of the hill overlooking”. JBr mentions an “old inn” at the “bottom of the hill”; JF mentions a “burnt out tavern” at the “bottom of the hill”; JB mentions a “guest house” west of the hill; and JS mentions a “cottage” being reached by following “the path”.*

**[MC]** *JB’s description fits three locations yardage wise; a line drawn between the two mottes in a north-south direction, the lower ridge immediately to the east-south-east of the larger motte that is the continuation of the Wyler Berg ridge, and the lower ridge immediately to the west-south-west of the larger motte. But all of these have a southern slope much gentler than that on the north and west faces . His reference to the ‘guest house’ being 200 yards from the western slope either put him on the Wyler Berg ridge east of Teufels Berg or he is referring to the solitary building west of 75.9 at the intersection of the Nijmegen-Wyler highway and the Bad Wyler causeway.*

**[MC]** *I believe that all are referring to the same location, i.e. the Zum Teufelsberg Inn (today’s Duivelsberg Pannekoeken Restaurant) since it stands out so poignantly in their memories. Depending on whether you are standing north or south of today’s de Duivelsberg Pannekoeken Restaurant you will describe it as either being at the bottom of the hill or at the top of the ridge. It is however, possible that they are referring to two different buildings.*

**[HQ]** “In the morning Company C, on Lt. Col. Warren's order, flushed the area around DEVIL'S HILL, seizing 12 prisoners who had fled from the hilltop toward HOLLAND (*west*) instead of into GERMANY during the previous days' attack. The prisoners evacuated our wounded. Two British M-10's, approaching from the 3rd Bn. area, picked up 10 wounded Germans in the area who had been unable to retreat with their company.”

**[JS]** ”A number of German soldiers were killed in the assault on the hill and their bodies were left strewn over the area, remaining there the entire time we occupied the ground. We used the bodies as landmarks in giving directions to the cottage (and other needs for messenger service). As I recall, to get to the cottage we went as far as the non-commissioned officer lying on his back with his mouth wide open and his left hand raised – then took the path to the right.”

**[MC]** *The attacks against Teufels Berg on this day were part of a much larger German response thrown against the 508th …from the north against Beek, from the east against Wyler and from north and east against the Wyler Berg east of Teufels berg.*

**[GH]** “Attacked at Wyler by one company of enemy infantry moving north and two companies of enemy infantry moving south, all supported by artillery and armor. Forced to withdraw to high ground to west. Enemy immediately occupied Im Thal and Lagewald. Attacked at Beek at 1200 by 2 battalions of enemy parachutists supported by armored vehicles, and forced to withdraw 1000 yeards to high ground to south-west. By counterattack drove enemy from and reoccupied Beek at 2140. Attacked again at Beek 2300 by enemy now reinforced and compelled to withdraw, leaving a detachment surrounded by the enemy in the town. Captured document from prisoner of war which revealed that enemy attacks at Mook, Beek, and Wyler were part of a coordinated division attack intended to split division area and sever the Grave-Nijmegen highway.”

**[HQ]** “At approximately 0800 hour, on the 20th, a German truck carrying supplies and 10 men approached the roadblock from the southeast. One of the 57mm guns fired and a MG fired on the truck. The truck was disabled and all except three Germans, who escaped along a road ditch into the woods, were killed. At about 0810 a motorcycle approached from the same direction. The rider saw the demolished truck, turned and rode away before he could be killed. At 0845 hour enemy infantry, estimated at one company, was seen moving across the open ground from southwest to northeast at a distance of about 800 yards from the road block. The enemy was partially concealed by the heavy mist and moved out of sight in the hedgerows and ditches towards GERMANY. At 0930 hour the road block received ten rounds from an enemy artillery piece (88mm or 75mm) located in ZYFFLICH, GERMANY (7859). Artillery fire was adjusted on the gun position by 300 radio and no more fire was received from there. At 0950 hour the roadblock received fire from two enemy 20mm guns located in ZYFFLICH, and from enemy MG's at 792587. At the same time it was discovered that troops (estimated two companies of infantry) were advancing from the north and northeast. An artillery barrage was called for immediately and it broke up the enemy attack on both fronts. About an hour an a half later the enemy again advanced in force, firing MG's and small arms. The fire was returned, and a fight began; at the same time sniper fire broke out from several houses in the village. The Germans set fire to a couple of buildings and under cover of the smoke began to infiltrate around the road block. The enemy advance continued across the field developing into a strong attack of battalion strength, well supported by artillery.”

**[MC]** *Back at the Oude Kleefsebaan road where JB and his covering team were left during Foley’s march to the Teufels Berg …*

**[JB]** “Two German soldiers came forward with arms raised as if to surrender. At a distance of about fifty yards we could see that one of them had something on his back. Shortly he fell forward and the second soldier attempted to fire the machine gun that was attached to his comrade's back. We had our sights set on them; they were riddled with gunfire. Later in the morning we received an order to join the Foley force. As we moved from this position a barrage of mortar fire came in; we were in luck to have moved Just in time. We left the positions on the double and were fired on by a machine gun. A bullet struck the heel of Pfc. Don Johnson's boot, partially removing it. We were greeted by Lt. Foley as we arrived on the hill. We were given a sector of the hill to defend.”

**[JB]** “From the foxhole I was occupying, I could see the bodies of several of my comrades. Under the situation our troops had not had time to collect and bury them. These had been victims of the initial attack the evening before. On the north and east side several German bodies lay sprawled. Both sides had paid a high price for control of the hill. At dusk I thought it was a good time to give my Sub-Thompson a cleaning. Standing in my foxhole, I began to dis-assemble it. The driving rod that is compressed by a spring slipped by my thumb and flew away. This is the first time in combat that I panicked. I went crazy feeling in the foxhole and around the outside. I knew my life and others depended on that weapon. I got myself together and formed a search plan. My plan was to start around the fox hole patting the ground one hand span, second time around another hand span and so on. About the time I was arm’s length out I felt that driving rod. I re-assembled the weapon in darkness and was a pleased soldier under those circumstances.”

**[JB]** “A few shots were fired after dark and Lt. Foley issued an order from the Company Command Post, verbally (loud and clear). ‘Go easy on the ammo, we're running low.’ Our position was no secret, the Germans knew we were here. During the night only a few shots were fired and a couple of grenades were dropped down the slope at German probing patrols.”

**[HQ]** “From 20-23 September, Company A repulsed four attacks in company plus strength. Attacks were made by parachutists (fighting as regular infantry), plus marines and flak troops. The parachutists were especially fanatical; at one time charging to within 15 feet of the machine guns located 300 feet above the road on the hilltop. Attacks were made from three and four sides at once. Food and ammunition were extremely short. At one time a patrol of selected NCO's sent to battalion for ammunition, returned (with 4 bandoliers, 1 box of LMG, and 200 rounds of TSMG, apiece) to find that the enemy had attacked in their absence, that automatic weapon ammunition had been entirely expended, and that the riflemen were down to an average of five rounds (not clips) apiece. One rifleman asked his squad leader where the company would withdraw when out of ammunition and was told, ‘We can withdraw straight up or straight down and that's all.’ The constant attacks and enemy night infiltration allowed the men of Company A very little sleep. At night men in adjoining foxholes tied bandoliers to each other to pull each other awake. A German paratrooper, with a belt-full of grenades, was shot one night within a few feet of a foxhole. However, during the remainder of their defense of Devil’s Hill, only one more Company A man was killed.”

**[RW]** “I had no thoughts of being over-run until we were low on ammo. At the time of one of the attacks we were low on ammo, I thought this was it.  I got out of my foxhole and sat on the side of it to see better for my sqd. was on the side of the hill looking down into the woods. As for food and water after we were out we got it out of the dead German packs.”

**[JBr]** “We realized we were cut off. Hq. affirmed this by radio, but said Lt. Col. Mendez could try and get to us after sunset. He apparently got lost. We never saw him. That night Jerry made many attempt to get up the hill but they were repelled.”

**21 September 1944 – Day 2 on the Hill**

**[JB]** “At day break a BAR opens up full blast. Here is Lt. Foley's voice again. ‘Who in the hell is wasting that ammo?’ Sgt. Joe Boone answers from a position on the east side. ‘If you think we've wasted ammo, come have a look.’ He had knocked off the lead element of an attack force. About an hour later the hill came under mortar fire. All during this day and night Germans probed around the hill.”

**[TB]** “On September 21st, our battalion situation was chaotic. Company A, was fighting to hold Devil’s Hill.  B Company was fighting off German attacks and the battalion area was infested with German snipers. The marksmanship of the German snipers was extraordinary skilful. Of the 17 men killed by sniper fire, 10 were killed by head shots. About noon the Germans increased the tempo of their attacks. All four of our guns were firing. My squad leader called for ammunition and as trained we threw a box of 250 rounds towards him. The ammunition box hit me on the back and simultaneously I was shot in the head.”

**[JBr]** “The next morning (*This morning*) things were so bad we had to call for artillery on our position. The attack was repelled but we lost two men from our own artillery.

**[SW]** “By the AM of D plus 4 the pressure was general all along the line, and communications with A on the Teufels Berg was gone. A volunteer wire team fought through with an ammo carrying party and repaired the cut line, Captain Adams, Lt Lamm, and the bulk of the A Company 1st Platoon rejoined the battalion. The 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Vandervort had liberated them the previous day. This force joined up with A company in time to help repel another series of attempts by the Germans to take the Teufels Berg, which was coupled with another attack aimed up the international boundary road. This attack was stopped after some severe fighting, with a big assist going to the 319th FA Battalion for one emergency barrage which fell squarely on the German main effort. Another counterattack to A Company met no German resistance, resupplied the company and took their wounded out. (A company, when resupplied had five rounds per M-l rifle, and no machine ammo left. Their ten casualties were all head wounds).”

**[HQ]** “On September 21st, Lt. Havens and 14 men, who had been holding high ground to the south, rejoined the company. An hour after they had left their former position German machine guns were still firing on it. Lt. Havens placed his men to the ‘rear’ of the company (the south side) just in time to assist in repulsing the final and most bitter attack. On the next day Captain Adams, Lt. Lamm and the remainder of the 1st Platoon returned to the company from NIJMEGEN.”

**22 September 1944 – Day 3 on the Hill**

**[JB]** “Enemy activity not as active as had been. Lt. Foley issued an order to the 1st Plt. to bury our dead. Sgt. Van Enwyck gives me this detail. I take several men with entrenching tools and start digging a massive grave for our eleven KIA's. Sgt. Van Enwyck and I recover the bodies and lay them out for burial. There was Cpl. Pierce, a fine soldier, Pfc. Bell, a replacement who was always asking about the Normandy operation, the Lt., Plt. Ldr. of the G Co. Plt. These bodies were laid in the grave with faces uncovered. I tell Sgt. Van Enwyck that we must cover the faces of these comrades before covering them with dirt. Van Enwyck details four men; he and these four make a dash for the guest house (tavern) and secure table cloths. They return without being fired upon. We cover our deceased comrades and bury them with respect. A cross was made from a tree we chopped down and placed at the center of the grave. A dog tag from each body was draped over the cross leaving identity of our comrades.”

**[JB]** “We are very low on ammo. No re-supply since we have been on the hill. Around 2200 hrs. (10:00) Lt. Foley requested a volunteer from the 1st Plt. to go to Regt. Pfc. Bonge told me he could make it to Regt. through the Germans. His only sweat and fear is getting back on Devil's Hill without being shot by our troops. I assure him I'll stand guard and await his return. Our signal was when he approached the Hill to call "Blue". Bonge was briefed and he was on his way. Sometime before morning I heard his voice, loud and clear, ‘Blue’. I answered, Come on up Bonge.’ Pfc. Bonge had contacted Regt. and led an ammo carrying detail back to Devil's Hill. Pfc. Bonge is one of the many heroes that are not on record for valor.”

**[MC]** *Tuefelsberg was not the only part of the ridge occupied by the 508th. The adjacent Wyler Berg was also occupied and defended as a result of the earlier retreat from Wyler.*

**[GH]** “Held Wyler Berg throughout the day and night against persistent enemy counterattacks. With one company Royals attached, effected a reconnaissance in force to Wercheren and high ground west of Erlekom. Met strong resistance and withdrew to high ground vicinity Berg en Dal.

**[SW]** “To recapitulate, the 1st Battalion during the four and one-half day period had been in almost continuous action, had captured over two hundred German prisoners, killed over one hundred, and successfully accomplished every mission assigned it, except the one mission of securing the bridge over the Waal at Nijmegen. It is the unswerving belief of the undersigned that with the forces available at the time, the mission assigned was not possible of accomplishment at the time it was given. Had the entire battalion been available to the Battalion Commander, it may have been possible. It is also quite evident that had the mission been assigned to the battalion on landing, it is very possible that the bridge could have been secured without difficulty. Whether it could have been held at both ends without the battalion being reinforced is problematical. The question also arises that had the 1st Battalion not been available to its regiment on D plus 1 through D plus 4, who would have accomplished the very necessary missions assigned it during that period?”

**[FC]** “For five days, Lt. FOLEY defended his position under ceaseless artillery and mortar bombardment, repelling attacks by vastly superior forces and countering aggressive enemy patrol action, both day and night.  The tireless, determined efforts of Lt. FOLEY in the attack and subsequently in the conduct of his exemplary leadership gave much encouragement to his men and played a large part in the stubborn defense of his position against a numerically superior enemy.  This accomplishment effectively weakened the enemy in this sector and hastened their eventual withdrawal.  Lt. FOLEY rendered a vital and distinguished service in the defense against German offensive action aimed at seizing the key terrain south of Nijmegen.  His conduct reflects the finest traditions of the United States Army.”

**23 September 1944 – Day 4 on the Hill**

**[JB]** “The situation normal, probing patrols and mortar fire as usual.”

**24 September 1944 – Day 5 on the Hill**

**[JB]** “Rumors have reached us that the British have linked up and the Nijmegen bridge in our hands. Around noon A Company of the 504 Parachute Infantry Regiment moves in to relieve us. Now Devil's Hill is no longer isolated, it has been a part of the Division perimeter. As the Foley force departs the hill we glance back for the last look at the mass grave of our comrades. We paid a high price for this hill, but we knew we had been trained for this type mission. All were volunteer and this was part of a day's work for AIRBORNE troops. We move back to a well-deserved 24-hour rest area and join Capt. Adams and our 2nd Plt.”

**[JBr]** Four days after our attack the British relieved us. We hadn’t eaten for two – three days depending on how many ‘K’ rations we had carried. Our ammunition was down to a few rounds each. The British lost the hill three days later. Something I forgot to mention before, after we dug in, I reached for a ‘K’ ration in my bulging jump pockets. There were bullet holes in each pocket. How’s that for the luck of the Irish”

**Sources:**

[AC] Albert Chrisman, Pvt., Light Machine Gun Plt., Hq1., A Co., 508th PIR.

[AR] Angel Romero

[BC] Bill Call, Lt., G Co., 508th PIR.

[BE] Battleground Europe – Operation Market Garden – Nijmegen Grave and Groesbeek, US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division, Ch: The Capture of Beek and Devil’s Hill – Tuesday 19 September 1944. Tim Saunders, Pen & Sword Books Limited (*I consider this the least reliable of all the sources because Saunders makes a number of blatant and careless errors such as saying that de Duivelsberg is the highest point in Holland. Pfffft! It isn’t even the highest point around Groesbeek!)*

[RB] Ralph V. Booth – Pvt., Light Machine Gun Plt., Hq1., A Co., 508th PIR.

[TB] Thomas J. Broderick – Pvt., Light Machine Gun Plt., Hq1, A Co., 508th PIR.



[CG] Charles Gushue - Sgt., Sqd. Ldr., 2nd Plt., A Co., 508th PIR.

[DG] De Gelderlander (E-Newspaper) Loopgraaf uit WOII in Berg en Dal vereewigd op landkaart. 07/02/14 Roeland Segeren.

[FC] Foley Citation. (508th Parachute Regiment), HEADQUARTERS XVIII CORPS (AIRBORNE), APO 2109, United States Army, CITATION FOR THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS.

[GG] Geschiedenis Groesbeek. - Groesbeek Tijdens de Tweede Wereld Orlog - Heuvel 75.9 De Duivelsberg http://www.geschiedenisgroesbeek.nl/oorlogsberg.htm

[TG] The Greatest of the Greatest Generation - Holland, September 17 to November 11, 1944, Market-Garden

[GH] A Graphic History of the 82nd Airborne Division – Operation Market Garden – Holland 1944. James M. Gavin, Major General U.S.A. Commanding [UNCLASSIFIED]. (*A collection of original reports. Unfortunately all of the Graphic Plates and Maps of the Landings were missing.*).

[HQ] HEADQUARTERS, 508TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY, APO #230, U. S. ARMY, 7 December 1944, 57 DAYS IN HOLLAND AND GERMANY WITH THE 508TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY, A. – 1st Battalion: 17 September to 24 September 1944.  
http://508pir.org/images/personnel/past/co_a/blue_j_r_pvt_small.jpg[JB] James Blue, A Company, 1st Battalion, 508th PIR

[JB] James R. Blue - Pfc., acting Sqd. Ldr., 1st Pln., A Co., 508th PIR.

[JBo] Jan Bos – Dutch civilian, Honorary Member 508th Parachute Infantry Regimental Association

[JBr] John E. Brickley - Sgt., Hq., A Co. Radio Operator (radio was destroyed by flak during jump)

[JF] John Foley - 1st Lt., acting Commander, Hq., A Co., 508th PIR.

[JS] John Schultz - Pfc., (in Sgt. Mullen’s Sqd.), A Co., 508th PIR

[LF] Lawrence Fitzpatrick - Light Machine Gun Plt., Hq1., A Co., 508th PIR.

[MC] *My comments.*

[PN] Phil Nordyke, Put Us Down in Hell – The Combat History of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II, Published by Historic Ventures LLC, 2012

[RL] Roy E. Lindquist – Colonel, CO., 508th PIR … source?

[RW] Robert White – Sgt., Sqd. Leader, 1st Sqd., 3rd Plt,. A Co., 508th PIR … source?

[SW] SHIELDS WARREN JR. - Lt. Colonel, CO., 1st Battalion, 508th PIR, 6 June I944 - 15 September l945, Narrative of events of the 1st Battalion 508th Parachute Infantry for period 17 - 21 September 1944, in the vicinity of Nijmegen, Holland. … Source?

[SV] Sherman Van Enwyck – Staff Sergeant 1st Plt. A Co. (the platoon sergeant)

[UC] *Comments inserted by unknown commentator.*

**Analysis of Sources**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Bn. Hq. [SW], [HQ]** | | | | |
| **A Co. Hq.** | **Hq1 Plt.** | **1st Plt.** | **2nd Plt.** | **3rd Plt.** | **G. Co.** |
| **[JF][JBr]** | [AC], [RB], [TB], [LF] | [JB] | [CG] | [RW] | [BC] |
| **Unknown** | [AR], [JS] | | | | |