Hermann Balck, Greatest German General?

[Lethaface]

In the meantime I had also finished the book. Indeed he doesn't go into the details that often, although he does shed his view on the concepts of how to successfully wage war. He advocates that offense is most of the times less costly than defense and the importance of having good intelligence, leadership, discipline and frank & direct communication, among other stuff.

He would usually try to lead the proceedings from as far forward as possible, making sure that intelligence is correct and orders given in a timely fashion to the proper recipients at the place where they can do something with it now(!). Basically that's his recipe for success: Well trained, equipped, fed and led men coupled with a healthy war industry and competent leadership that knows how to communicate and a good dose of esprit de corps.

Imo regarding the art of war his advise is to present a good front / anvil for the enemy to attack/focus against, while circling around an armored formation and attacking the enemy in the rear on an operational scale (on the scale of a usual CM battles it would mean you start off with a tank company or two in the enemy rear, while they are attacking your frontline). The details / devils are in actually having good trained, equipped fed and led men with competent leadership on a operation that makes sense.

Although in itself those are sound tactics for CM as well imo. Step 1: try to give the enemy something to push against and occupy the bulk of his forces. Step 2: move armor in his rear and shoot the enemy up .

Anyway agreed with @mTk that it is well worth the read for the historic side of things.

@HOA_KSOP a book by von Mellithin sounds interesting, especially if it does go into the details of battles / accounts that Balck doesn't. Have you made any progress in it? Im tempted to look for it and order it up. Thanks!

 

[HOA_KSOP]

@Lethaface, somewhere in my mass of books I have "Panzer Battles" . I have about 5 big bins of books to read. I read Mellithin's book years ago and he served with several leading Wehrmacht panzer generals and his recollections are worth reading.

I am currently reading a book on Lucian K. Truscott, "Dogface". Truscott is the only US general to have commanded a regiment, division, corps and army in World War 2. Very solid, capable combat general, famous for the "Truscott Trot" and making the 3rd ID one of the best US divisions in WW2, and taking over for Lucas at "Anzio". He also led Patton's drive across Northern Sicily and Patch's initial drive in southern France.

 

[Bulletpoint]

Basically that's his recipe for success: Well trained, equipped, fed and led men coupled with a healthy war industry and competent leadership that knows how to communicate and a good dose of esprit de corps.

I don't think anyone would argue that he's wrong. But it also seems to reflect the thinking of his day. That wars are won in "decisive battles" by those who are best at the "art of war".

Yet the Germans had most of those things covered and yet they lost the war. While the Soviets didn't have most of those things, and yet they won.

As I see it, the main thing about modern warfare is being able to mobilise more resources than the other side, and absorb more losses. The rest is details.

 

[Lethaface]

I don't think anyone would argue that he's wrong. But it also seems to reflect the thinking of his day. That wars are won in "decisive battles" by those who are best at the "art of war".

Yet the Germans had most of those things covered and yet they lost the war. While the Soviets didn't have most of those things, and yet they won.

As I see it, the main thing about modern warfare is being able to mobilise more resources than the other side, and absorb more losses. The rest is details.

Well the Germans had the strategic situation against them, plus (fortunately) quite a lot problems with their leadership at higher levels. The Soviet, in the end, probably had adequate leadership at the most important levels and enough of everything else (men, tanks, fuel, etc), plus a doctrine which acknowledged the facts on the ground. So indeed even with a bunch of great generals and a very well trained troops, you can still lose wars.

I don't really agree with your last sentence though. You can have a bunch of resources and a lot of people which you'd like to die for their cause. Look at the Aghan army, they had quite a bunch of resources thrown at them and were, on paper, 300k strong. They lost against a smaller force with, probably, 100x or more less resources and less personnel.
But in a peer level war where everything is relatively comparable and no swift decision is made and all parties are prepared to go to the bitter end, than yes indeed it becomes a war of attrition. And the more modern, the more powerful weapons are and thus the more lethal wars become. Until the machines take over at least ;-)

 

[Bulletpoint]

I don't really agree with your last sentence though. You can have a bunch of resources and a lot of people which you'd like to die for their cause. Look at the Aghan army, they had quite a bunch of resources thrown at them and were, on paper, 300k strong. They lost against a smaller force with, probably, 100x or more less resources and less personnel.

I wrote a bit about the Afghanistan situation in the original post, but then deleted it because it was going off topic. And instead I just added "and ability to absorb losses".

In the end, the Taliban had more resources than even the USA if you count patience and ability to tolerate losses. A bit like the Soviet Union could lose massively for a very long time and still win in the end.

 

[Lethaface]

I wrote a bit about the Afghanistan situation in the original post, but then deleted it because it was going off topic.

Lol well it is in the news now I guess ;-)

And instead I just added "and ability to absorb losses".

In the end, the Taliban had more resources than even the USA if you count patience and ability to tolerate losses. A bit like the Soviet Union could lose massively for a very long time and still win in the end.

I'd say in this case mainly patience, they didn't need to go out and take too many losses and they knew sooner or later the USA would go. And indeed the Taliban probably can tolerate losses more easily.

But I was talking about the Afghan Army, it's resources and manpower. In spite all of those numbers and probably/certainly due to corruption, there is no will to fight for fellow soldiers among many of the troops. So the whole thing collapses like a house of cards. Similar to what happened in Iraq against Daesh in Mosul originally. So I think only resources and the ability to absorb losses is a bit too much of a simplification. One needs the (c)apability to translate those numbers to actual deeds on the ground, usually measured in enemy personnel casualties or material losses, but also the enemy will to fight in a broader sense. If it are only your forces who are doing the dying and using up resources, it won't work out. However if you can trade with the enemy and maintain that ratio for at least as long until the enemy has nothing left to give, while you still have some, than obviously you'd win. That's basically exactly what the concept of 'war of attrition' means.

You could also invent some index number 'capability to wage war' and ground it in some sort of balanced scorecard. Indeed than it's always the one with the highest remaining score which wins But to say that all the rest about war is details, I don't agree. Probably why I'm into tactical games like CM ;-).

 

[Bulletpoint]

But I was talking about the Afghan Army, it's resources and manpower. In spite all of those numbers and probably/certainly due to corruption, there is no will to fight for fellow soldiers among many of the troops. So the whole thing collapses like a house of cards. Similar to what happened in Iraq against Daesh in Mosul originally. So I think only resources and the ability to absorb losses is a bit too much of a simplification.

It's definitely a simplification, and we don't really disagree. I'm just musing a bit and looking at it from another direction. My point is more that winning and losing wars is mostly a question of political "grand strategy", and that "peer" wars between two equally matched enemies rarely ever happen, if at all.

The Afghan government lost the war the moment the US announced they would withdraw. No more air support, no more resources flowing in to replace the constant losses. And I think everybody in Afghanistan knew that. That's why their army folded so quickly. They were American pawns, and when the chess player shakes hands with his opponent and leaves, the pieces know the game is over.

But even if they had been 300,000 highly motivated soldiers, I don't think they could ever have won - in the long term. The British Empire couldn't, the Soviets couldn't, and now the USA couldn't.

When it comes to the US Army, I think they checked all the boxes on Balck's list:

Basically that's his recipe for success: Well trained, equipped, fed and led men coupled with a healthy war industry and competent leadership that knows how to communicate and a good dose of esprit de corps.

 

[Lethaface]

It's definitely a simplification, and we don't really disagree. I'm just musing a bit and looking at it from another direction. My point is more that winning and losing wars is mostly a question of political "grand strategy", and that "peer" wars between two equally matched enemies rarely ever happen, if at all.

The Afghan government lost the war the moment the US announced they would withdraw. No more air support, no more resources flowing in to replace the constant losses. And I think everybody in Afghanistan knew that. That's why their army folded so quickly. They were American pawns, and when the chess player shakes hands with his opponent and leaves, the pieces know the game is over.

But even if they had been 300,000 highly motivated soldiers, I don't think they could ever have won - in the long term. The British Empire couldn't, the Soviets couldn't, and now the USA couldn't.

Indeed, no surprises to be found here - unfortunately. I think I can remember an article back from early 2000 about Taliban having the time on their side. Anyway probably only an army of intrinsically motivated Afghan national could do it, the current Afghan Army surely wasn't up to that task. Although I heard that in some parts they're actually fighting.

When it comes to the US Army, I think they checked all the boxes on Balck's list:

Yeah, but I probably forgot to include a clear and attainable political goal. Or perhaps that's what was lacking in Balck's case as well